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 ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigated the ‘latent deficit’ hypothesis in two groups of head-injured 
patients with predominantly frontal lesions, those injured prior to steep morphological 
and corresponding functional maturational periods for frontal networks (≤ age 25), 
and those injured >28 years. The latent deficit hypothesis proposes that early injuries 
produce enduring cognitive deficits manifest later in the lifespan with graver 
consequences for behavior than adult injuries, particularly after frontal pathology 
(Eslinger, Grattan, Damasio & Damasio, 1992). Implicit and executive deficits both 
contribute to behavioral insight after frontal head injury (Barker, Andrade, 
Romanowski, Morton & Wasti, 2006). On the basis of morphological and behavioral 
data, we hypothesised that early injury would confer greater vulnerability to 
impairment on tasks associated with frontal regions than later injury. Patients 
completed experimental tasks of implicit cognition, executive function measures and 
the DEX measure of behavioural insight (Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive 
Syndrome: Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, & Evans, 1996). The Early Injury 
group were more impaired on implicit cognition tasks compared to controls that Late 
Injury patients. There were no marked group differences on most executive function 
measures. Executive ability only contributed to behavioral awareness in the Early 
Injury Group. Findings showed that age at injury moderates the relationship between 
executive and implicit cognition and behavioral insight and that early injuries result in 
long-standing deficits to functions associated with frontal regions partially supporting 
the latent deficit hypothesis.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Pathology to anterior brain regions produces a constellation of deficits, although 
diminished self-regulation, poor behavioral insight, and other socio-emotional 
problems are the most incapacitating and resistant to rehabilitative efforts (Ponsford, 
2004; Bach & David, 2006). Behavioral insight refers to the capacity to acknowledge 
and exhibit awareness of functional deficits post-injury and is considered a useful 
marker of more general socio-behavioural problems (Hart, Seignourel & Sherer, 
2009; Flashman & McAllister, 2002). Diminished insight is associated with poor 
rehabilitation outcome, increased maladaptive behavior, heightened caregiver distress 
and reduced goal-directed self-regulatory behavior (Craik et al., 1999; D’Argembeau 
et al., 2005; Oddy, Coughlan, Tyerman & Jenkins, 1985; Sherer et al., 1998; Wise, 
Ownsworth & Fleming, 2005). Importantly, accurate self-appraisal (high behavioral 
insight) contributes significantly to post-injury emotional control and adaptive socio-
cognitive functioning (Schmitz, Rowley, Kawahara & Johnson, 2006). Recent 
imaging data show that self-appraisal accuracy is associated with activity to 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Rosen et al, 2010). Although functional recovery is 
deleteriously affected by reduced behavioral insight, injury severity, locus, extent and 
age at time of injury are also important determinants of outcome (Anderson et al., 
2009).  
 
Executive and implicit processes and behavioral insight 
 
Both executive and implicit functions are thought to contribute to insight into one’s 
own behavior, often termed self-evaluative accuracy or behavioral awareness (Morris 
& Hannesdottir, 2004; Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Schmitz et al., 2006). Executive 
functions are super-ordinate processes that operate across, inhibit or initiate other 
cognitive processes to produce integrated sequences of behavior (Miyake et al., 2000). 
Executive deficits are typically associated with pathology to frontal regions and these 
functions may dissociate post-injury with patients showing selective or multiple 
executive function deficits (Stuss & Alexander, 2007; Sullivan, Riccio & Castillo, 
2009). Diverse executive functions have been associated with post-injury awareness 
and include, self-regulation (Bogod, Mateer & MacDonald, 2003), sustained attention 
(O’Keeffe et al., 2007), and planning and mental flexibility (Ownsworth, McFarland 
& Young, 2000). Findings have been difficult to replicate mainly due to the use of 
single and heterogeneous measures of executive function and diverse methodologies 
across studies (Ownsworth & Fleming, 2005).  
 
Implicit processes operate by activating existing knowledge, strengthening links 
between concepts, or encoding new information in the absence of conscious 
awareness of learned information or the acquisition process. Implicit knowledge is 
acquired in parallel in contrast to explicit serial processing, facilitating or biasing 
behavioral responses outside of conscious volition. The term implicit cognition is 
used within the experimental literature to encompass the processes measured by a 
broad range of tasks testing behavioural and brain responses to subliminal, unnoticed 
or unattended stimuli or regularities between stimuli. These processes are thought to 
play an important role in ‘real world’ contexts, facilitating adaptive behavioral 
responses (Lieberman, 2000; Frith & Frith, 2008). Patients with lesions to frontal 
regions show diminished or abolished implicit learning on Serial Reaction Time tasks 
(SRT - Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), and lack of priming on a mere exposure effect task 
(Zajonc, 1980) compared to control data (Beldarrain, Grafman, de Valesco, Pascual-
Leone & Garcia-Monco, 2002; Morton & Barker, 2010), a pattern that maintains in 
patients with frontotemporal lesions (Barker, Andrade, Romanowski, Morton & 
Wasti, 2006).  
 
The SRT is a choice reaction time task incorporating a regular but lengthy sequence 
of targets. Implicit learning is expressed as faster responses to sequence compared to 
random trials, without awareness of the presence of a sequence. In mere exposure 
effect tasks processing of subliminal or unattended stimuli primes a preferential 
response (increased liking) to those stimuli. In models of behavioral awareness 
implicit processes such as these are thought to operate by augmenting metacognitive 
awareness (mediated by executive functions), and by guiding behavioral responses in 
the absence of explicit awareness (Ownsworth, Clare & Morris, 2006; Toglia & Kirk, 
2000; Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004). Absence of priming and inability to acquire an 
implicit sequence suggests disruption to mechanism(s) that might normally guide 
behavior in the absence of awareness (Barker et al., 2006). Whilst models of 
behavioral awareness typically include executive and implicit components, the 
implicit component is generally under-specified with limited explanation of how 
implicit processes modulate awareness, and is not measured experimentally. In 
addition, behavioral awareness models do not account for the possibility that implicit 
processes are disrupted after neuropathology (Ownsworth, Clare & Morris, 2006; 
Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004; Schacter, 1990). One aim of the 
present study was to investigate the contribution of implicit cognition to behavioral 
insight and to test whether age at injury affected this contribution. 
 
Neuroplasticity and the ‘latent deficit’ hypothesis 
There is ongoing debate about whether cognitive behavioral effects of head injury 
vary depending on age at time of head injury (Kolb, 1995; Anderson et al., 2009). 
This debate is particularly relevant to individuals with frontal pathology as these 
regions undergo a protracted period of maturation that may confer developmental 
vulnerability to pathophysiological processes (Paus, Keshevan & Giedd, 2008). 
Traditionally, theories of neuroplasticity and age at injury have presented conflicting 
findings of either preserved function after early compared to later injury (Kennard, 
1940), or intractable functional deficits due to abolition of elementary functions 
underpinning cognitive systems (Hebb, 1949). A possible reason for contradictory 
findings is that consequences of early brain injury (to frontal regions in particular) are 
not fully apparent until later developmental periods when cognitive resources driving 
autonomy, independence, goal-directed, prosocial and sexual behavior are most in 
demand (Williams & Mateer, 1992). More data are needed to address this question as 
adolescents and young adults (particularly males) are highly represented in the head-
injured population and frontal and temporal regions are particularly vulnerable to 
trauma after insult due to their position within the skull (Sosin, Sacks & Webb, 1996; 
Kolb & Whishaw, 1990), trajectory of the brain on impact, and proximal and distal 
connections with other brain regions. Early frontal insult may therefore result in 
graver deficits, because the brain is maturing and consequently vulnerable, that are 
latent in the sense that they emerge later in development. Findings from longitudinal 
case studies (Anderson, Catroppa, Morse, Haritou & Rosenfeld, 2005; Anderson, 
Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 2000; Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 
1999; Barlow, Thomson, Johnson & Minns, 2005; Eslinger, Biddle & Grattan, 1997; 
Eslinger, Flaherty-Craig & Benton, 2004; Tranel & Eslinger, 2000), and group studies 
(Ewing-Cobbs et al., 2006) support this ‘latent deficit’ hypothesis  
Morphological maturation of anterior structures 
Morphological studies reveal a phase of steep maturation occurring in late 
adolescence and early adulthood to anterior brain regions. Temporal and spatial maps 
of MRI scans show patterns of maturation from around age 14 to age 26 localised to 
large regions of frontal cortex and lenticular nuclei with little change to other regions 
(Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan & Toga, 1999). Gogtay et al., (2004) found 
that changes in gray matter volume follow a non-linear pattern across different brain 
regions, with loss of gray matter density (either through synaptic pruning or intra-
cortical myelination - Paus, 2005) to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior 
superior temporal gyrus only evident after age 16-17 years in healthy adolescents. In a 
longitudinal study of 8 healthy subjects aged 11 to 17.5 the greatest mean increase in 
white matter volume was found in frontal lobes (ranging from 8.4 - 26.8%) across the 
two time points, indicating rapid maturation of these regions during late adolescence 
compared to other brain regions (Riddle et al., 2008). Subcortical tracts (extending 
into frontal regions) and corticospinal tract continue to undergo change up to age 25 
(Lebel, Walker, Phillips & Beaulieu, 2008), and there is some indication that 
maturational change may continue to age 30 in superior temporal cortex (Sowell et 
al., 2003). 
Morphological changes correspond with socio-cognitive maturation occurring through 
adolescence and early adulthood (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006). Evidence 
indicates that psychosocial and logical reasoning functions continue to mature until 
around age 25 (Steinberg, 2007). Executive functions follow a similar trajectory, with 
protracted development extending through adolescence into early adulthood 
(Anderson et al., 2001; Huizinga, Dolan & van der Molen, 2006; Levin et al., 1991; 
Lin, Chen, Yang, Hsiao & Tien, 2000; Romine & Reynolds, 2005). The same may be 
also true of implicit cognition. Adults outperformed 7-11 year old children on an 
implicit sequence-learning task, showing a significantly larger learning effect and 
more rapid learning (Thomas et al., 2004; but see Meulemans, van der Linden & 
Perruchet, 1998). Other studies found that schoolchildren performed worse than adults 
on implicit memory tasks (e.g. Vaidya, Huger, Howard & Howard, 2007 but see 
Hayes & Hennessy (1996) for developmental invariance argument), and older adults 
performed significantly better on a symbolic implicit learning task than younger 
adults (Bo & Seidler, 2009). Overall there are little data on the developmental 
variability of implicit processes in later childhood through adolescence to adulthood.  
 
To summarize, patients with frontal lesions show impaired executive function across a 
range of measures and diminished or abolished implicit cognition (measured by SRT, 
HCD and mere exposure effect tasks) across studies. There is evidence that both 
executive function and implicit cognition make separate contributions to behavioral 
insight also impaired after injury (Barker et al., 2006; Schacter, 1990; Morton & 
Barker, 2010). Impaired behavioral insight is thought to be a marker of intractable 
socio-behavioral problems post-injury. Frontal regions show steep morphological 
changes during adolescence extending into adulthood and are consequently vulnerable 
during this period (Paus, 2005). The present study tested the hypothesis that brain 
injury sustained during this period would have graver consequences for executive 
function, implicit cognition and behavioral insight in adulthood than similar injuries 
sustained later in the lifespan. We also tested whether age at injury moderated the 
expected relationships between these variables.  
 
We selected SRT and mere exposure effect implicit tasks to measure implicit 
cognition as they are thought to correspond to mechanisms governing tacit non-verbal 
decoding and encoding of information respectively (Lieberman, 2000), and are 
sensitive to frontal pathology across patient-based studies. We selected a battery of 
standardized executive function tasks to contrast with single measures of executive 
function used in other behavioral insight studies. Behavioral insight was measured 
using the DEX Questionnaire (Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome 
– BADS, Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, & Evans, 1996) a standardized 
measure widely used in clinical assessment. Though we are not concerned with the 
precise neural substrates of functions measured here imaging data show frontal 
activation during SRT (Seidler et al., 2005; Honda et al., 1998; Wong, Bernat, Bunce 
& Shevrin, 1997) and behavioral insight task performance (Schmitz et al., 2006) 
supporting neuropsychological findings and the assumption that these functions are 
disrupted after frontal pathology.  
 
Two groups of closed head injury patients with pathology mostly confined to frontal 
regions completed the study. Patients who sustained insult during developmentally 
sensitive periods (up to age 25) on the basis of maturational and behavioral data were 
categorized as ‘Early Injury,’ the ‘Late Injury’ group sustained injury from age 28 
onwards. Age- and IQ-matched controls allowed comparison of the extent of implicit 
deficits across the two patient groups. In line with previous work, we predicted that 
patients would be impaired on implicit experimental tasks compared to matched 
controls. 
 
 
METHOD 
We investigated the effect of age at time of head injury in 32 traumatically brain 
injured (TBI) patients with mostly frontal lesions on implicit cognitive tasks, 
executive function ability and a measure of behavioral insight used in clinical 
assessments. For the Early Injury group, imaging data showed pathology to frontal 
and temporal regions in four cases, ten cases had frontal pathology (only identified via 
medical records and clinical presentation for Case 2 and Case 5 as they were 
considered too high risk to transport for scans), Case 3 was acollosal anteriorly, Case 
10 had lesions to anterior corpus callosum, and Case 15 had lesions to centrum 
semiovale (Table 2). In the Late Injury group, 5 cases had frontotemporal pathology, 
only identified by CT and medical records for Case 5 who had an aneurysm clip due 
to a frontal bleed predating a frontal head injury, and Case 14 who had ocular metal 
fragments. Case 1 had bilateral temporal lobe contusions. The remaining 10 had 
frontal contusions, identified by CT for case 8 who could not be scanned due to a 
metal eye socket. Age- and IQ-matched controls completed experimental tasks to 
provide normative data. Using a range of measures allowed us to explore possible age 
of injury effects on severity of functional deficit and contribution of executive and 
implicit processes to post-injury behavioral insight. 
 
Participants 
 Ethical approval was granted by Sheffield South, North, Barnsley and Doncaster 
NHS Research Committee. All participants gave informed consent and were a 
minimum of 18 years of age at test. Time since injury duration varied from two to a 
maximum of ten years post-injury at time of testing to safeguard against measuring 
acute rather than chronic effects of injury (Lezak, 2004). Patients were recruited if 
they had sustained anterior injury at putatively sensitive developmental periods or 
later in adulthood, showed behavioral problems post-injury, and were impaired on at 
least one executive function subtest. Half of the patient group sustained insult in 
adolescence through early adulthood (n = 16 range, 12-25 years: Early Injury group) 
and half in later adulthood (n = 16, range 28-55 years: Late Injury group). All were 
right handed and none had any marked physical disability (see Table 1 results 
section). Patients were predominantly male reflecting regional demography with the 
exception of two females in the Late and one in the Early Injury group so our sample 
may be somewhat skewed. National demographics drawn from NICE (National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence) guidelines 2007 indicate that males constituted 70-
88% of all head-injured hospital admissions in the UK for that year. In relation to our 
sample these figures indicate that at the top of end of the range for a cohort of 32, 2.6 
participants should be female approximately in line with our sample. Regional 
demography may fluctuate due to differences in cause of head-injury, falls being the 
primary cause with assaults as the secondary cause at national levels. For our 
recruitment area assaults were the primary cause of head injury (followed by road 
traffic accidents), which may explain the low female to male ratio in our sample 
(direct.gov.uk). Occupational status was as follows for the Early Injury group at time 
of test: Resident in a rehabilitation unit (n = 5), independent with rehabilitative 
support (n = 10), employed in semi-skilled work (n = 1). Late Injury patients were 
classified as: Resident in a rehabilitation unit (n = 4), independent with rehabilitative 
support (n = 4), employed in semi-skilled work (n = 8). Patients with a history of 
alcoholism, depression, or drug addiction were not included in the study. 
 
All patients were MRi scanned on a 1.5 Tesla Eclipse scanner, Marconi Medical 
Systems (Cleveland, Ohio) unless there were medical or behavioral contraindications 
(e.g. metal aneurysm clips, violent behavior). Scan sequence and parameters were TR, 
TE, TI (fluid attenuated inversion recovery FLAIR only), slice thickness 4mm with 
2mm gap, T2 fast spin echo (FSE) in 3 planes (axial, coronal & sagittal), slice 
thickness 5mm with 1mm gap and T1 volume RF-FAST, slice thickness 1mm. 
Imaging data were analyzed using the Template Method (Damasio & Damasio, 1990). 
Regions were identified on the basis of Brodmann’s Area by the Consultant 
Neuroradiologist (Table 2). Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) scores at emergency 
admission and Post-Traumatic Amnesia (PTA) duration are also reported (Table 1). 
 
Patients were matched to controls for age, years of education and Full-Scale IQ 
(WAIS III Wechsler, 1997). Controls provided normative data for implicit 
experimental tasks and where possible spouses, siblings or significant others were 
recruited to match for demography. Patients completed the Wechsler Memory Scale-
R (WMS-R Wechsler, 1987) to screen for memory impairments that might account 
for performance deficits, The National Adult Reading Test (NART Nelson, 1991) to 
measure any IQ decline from pre-morbid levels, a range of executive function 
measures with good reliability and sensitivity indices, and a clinically used measure 
of behavioral insight (Table 3). Use of standardized neuropsychological measures 
with published normative data obviated the need to measure control performance on 
these tasks (other than the WAIS III for IQ matching). Early Injury patients (M = 5.7. 
SD, 1.6, range 0-9) and controls (M = 4.8, SD, 2.7; range: 2-11) t (1,30) = .37, p = 
.82, and Late Injury patients (M = 6.5, SD, 2.1, range: 2-10) and controls (M = 5.8, 
SD, 2.8, range: 3-9) t (1,30) = .41, p = .79 two-tailed fell within normal ranges for 
anxiety and depression on the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS 
Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). 
 
Procedure 
Test administration was counterbalanced across participants. Testing typically took 
place across several sessions with rest breaks determined by the participant; some 
patients were only able to concentrate for 15-20 minutes in any given session, others 
completed longer test sessions interspersed with brief five minute breaks. The SRT 
task was programmed with rest breaks hard-wired (duration determined by participant 
key press) after each block of 50 trials. The mere exposure effect task had no rest 
breaks as the task only took ten minutes to complete. 
 
Executive function measures 
The Hayling and Brixton tests measure response initiation, inhibition and rule 
detection (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The Behavioral Assessment of the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS, Wilson et al., 1996) provides a composite score 
from a range of executive function subtests measuring temporal sequencing, rule 
shifting, strategy initiation and action plan development, planning and goal-directed 
ability. The Wisconsin Card Sort Test (WCST, Heaton, 1981) measures the capacity 
to shift and maintain set. The C.O.W.A. (Controlled Oral Word Association Test – 
FAS version – Benton & Hamsher, 1989), a measure of verbal fluency, was also 
administered to patients and controls as a filler task between acquisition and test in the 
mere exposure effect task, although we are only interested in patient data here.  
 
Measure of post-injury behavioral insight (DEX – Wilson et al., 1996) 
The DEX is a 20-item scale with scores ranging from 0-4 (4 being the most severe). 
Questions sample emotional or personality change, behavioral change and 
motivational and cognitive changes. It comprises two versions, one completed by the 
patient (Self-rating: DEX-S), and the other by a clinician/ significant other 
(Independent-rating: DEX-I) who has close daily contact with the patient. DEX-I 
ratings are used clinically as a metric of degree and extent of post-injury behavioral 
insight. In line with convention we took correlation between Self- and Independent- 
ratings as a measure of awareness of type of deficit experienced and discrepancy 
score as a measure of degree of awareness of deficit (Hart, Seignourel & Sherer, 
2009). Self-ratings were subtracted from Independent-ratings to produce a DEX-
Insight score, a measure of the patient’s awareness of behavioral, cognitive and 
emotional deficits. This measure is thought to produce a more accurate discrepancy 
score than comparison of Self and Independent rating means because it takes account 
of rating differences by question. 
 
Implicit cognitive tasks 
We used two implicit experimental tasks previously shown to be sensitive to 
neuropathology, a measure of implicit judgment (mere exposure effect task Zajonc, 
1980) and a measure of implicit performance (serial reaction time task-SRT Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987). Performance on these tasks is thought to recruit the same 
mechanisms that mediate non-verbal encoding and decoding respectively (Lieberman, 
2000).  
 
Serial Reaction Time task 
This task was programmed in Psyscope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt & Provost, 1993) 
and presented on a Macintosh Powerbook 5300. Participants completed a practice 
session before beginning the task. At acquisition, participants responded as quickly as 
possible to a single target circle appearing at one of four screen locations evenly 
spaced in a row. The target was a 1cm diameter closed white circle on a black 
background. Each target location corresponded to a key on the keyboard of the 
computer (v, b, n or m) respectively. Circles disappeared when the appropriate key 
press was made and reaction times (RT’s) were recorded. Response-stimulus interval 
was 200 msec. Locations of the circle on the screen followed a predetermined 10 trial 
sequence, A B C D B C B D B C (see Seger, 1997). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two screen assignments to counterbalance the frequency of 
stimulus circle presentation at inner and outer locations. 
Stimuli were presented in six acquisition blocks of 50 trials (five x 10 trial sequence 
repetitions) constituting the learning phase of the task, with rest breaks between each 
block. At test, participants completed three blocks of 50 trials (150 trials in total), two 
random blocks flanking a sequence block. Test phase followed immediately after the 
acquisition phase without warning to participants. Typically, participants respond 
more slowly to random block trials compared to sequence trials at test indicating that 
the sequence has been learned. For random block trials, target locations were hard- 
wired into the programme in a pseudo-random order to ensure that performance 
differences between sequence and random blocks at test did not result from mere 
learning of first order frequency information. A random block of trials was also 
completed at the beginning of the acquisition phase to confound any automatic 
judgment by participants that circles might follow a pattern. 
 
After the task participants completed an explicit knowledge questionnaire (Seger, 
1997). They were informed that circles followed a sequence and rated how certain 
they were of the presence of a pattern, described any pattern that they had noticed, 
then rated (overleaf) how sure they were that the sequence consisted of a) ten 
positions (correct) and b) 12 or more positions. We used Seger's (1997) scoring 
method for the explicit task and her criterion that a score of sixteen or over showed 
explicit knowledge of the sequence. Each of the three test blocks (two random and 
one sequence block) produced 50 reaction time values, divisible as five repeats of ten 
trials. We calculated the median RTs for each of the five repeats of ten trials. The five 
medians for each block were combined to produce three means, one sequence mean 
and one mean for each random block. The two random block means were combined 
to produce a single mean. The sequence mean was subtracted from the random mean 
to provide a single learning score for each participant. 
 
Mere exposure effect task 
The mere exposure effect typically primes a preferential response to targets compared 
to foils. This task assessed participants’ preference for previously heard stimuli over 
foils. Participants listened to one of two lists of fifteen disyllabic Finnish words, 
matched for likeability, recorded on compact disc and presented aurally through 
headphones (see Andrade, Englert, Harper & Edwards, 2001). The word list was 
presented twice at a rate of one word per 1.5 seconds. Use of word lists as targets or 
foils was counterbalanced across participants. After the acquisition phase, the 
C.O.W.A. (Controlled Oral Word Association Test – FAS version – Benton & 
Hamsher, 1989) was administered for three minutes as a distractor task. This task was 
chosen specifically to prevent explicit rehearsal of prime words prior to test stage so 
that any preference effects could be reliably ascribed to tacit processing. Participants 
then heard a test list containing all 30 words, targets and foils, recorded in random 
order with a 4 second inter-stimulus interval. They were asked to guess whether the 
words meant something good or something bad on the basis of their sound, rating 
each word as "very nice/good", "slightly nice/good", "slightly nasty/bad" or "very 
nasty/bad". The aim of this instruction was to imply that there was a correct answer 
on each trial to discourage participants from making a global judgment about the 
sound of Finnish words and consequently rate each word identically. 
 
Task scores  
 
Response sheets were scored as follows: three points for "very nice", two points for 
"slightly nice", one point for "slightly nasty", and 0 points for "very nasty". Individual 
preference priming scores were calculated by subtracting the sum of preference 
ratings for foil words from the sum of preference ratings for target words for each 
participant. A negative or zero score indicated that priming did not take place whilst a 
positive value indicated that previously exposed words were preferred to new words. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
We analyzed patient group data separately (and compared to matched controls for 
implicit tasks) to determine possible group differences as an effect of age at injury on 
implicit, executive and DEX measures with all other variables held relatively equal 
(IQ, Glasgow Coma Scale scores, etc., see Table 1 and 2). Early Injury patients were 
well matched to controls for IQ, t (1, 30) = .35, p = .72 two-tailed, with no significant 
decline from pre-morbid IQ scores t (1, 15) = 1.0, p = .32 two-tailed (see Table 1 for 
Full-Scale scores). The Late Injury group were also well matched to controls for IQ, t 
(1, 30) = -.73, p = .47 two-tailed, similarly with no decline in IQ from pre-morbid 
levels t (1, 15) = -1.2, p = .24 two-tailed, and IQ scores did not differ for the two 
patient groups t (1, 30) = .65 p = .52 two-tailed. Number of years of education was 
similar for Early Injury patients (M = 11.5, SD 1.3, range: 11-16), and controls (M = 
11.7, SD 1.0, range: 11-14), t (1, 30) = -59, p = .56 two-tailed, and Late Injury 
patients (M = 11.7, SD 1.9, range: 10-18), and controls (M = 11.1, SD 0.8, range: 11-
14), t (1, 30) = 1.2, p = .24 two-tailed. Patient groups did not perform significantly 
differently on the WMS-R (Wecshler, 1987) measure of memory and attention (Table 
3). Early Injury patients were 5.9 (SD 2.6, range: 2-10) mean years since injury, Late 
Injury patients were 4.2 (SD 1.6, range: 2-9) mean years post-injury t (1, 30) = 2.3, p 
= .03 two-tailed with the Late Injury group less far on in the recovery process.  
 
[insert table 1 here] 
 
Neuropathology data 
Glasgow Coma Scale scores t (1, 30) = .56, p = .76 two-tailed, were not significantly 
different for the two groups. There was no significant difference in duration of Post-
Traumatic Amnesia t (1,30) = -1.8, p = .082 two-tailed although the Late Injury group 
had a greater mean duration of PTA than the Early Injury group (Table 1). For ease of 
comparison Brodmann’s regions were categorized as follows: Dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (BA 8, 9, 44, 45 and 46), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (BA 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 
and 47), and ‘other’ frontal and temporal regions. Pathology was heterogeneous and 
varied in location and severity within and between groups. In general terms, there 
were no marked differences in degree of pathology at the group level although Late 
Injury patients had greater incidence of bilateral frontal pathology than Early Injury 
patients (Table 2). Data correspond by case across tables for ease of comparison.  
 
[insert table 2 here] 
 
Patient scores on executive function measures and measure of behavioral insight 
Each patient was impaired on at least one executive function subtest (including BADS 
subtest scores) as criterion for inclusion to the study. The Late Injury group performed 
more poorly on the Hayling test of response initiation and response inhibition t (1, 30) 
= 3.0, p = .005 two-tailed, and the Brixton subtest of rule detection t (1, 30) = 2.1, p = 
.048 two-tailed than the Early Injury group (see Table 3 for descriptive data). Group 
means were not different for BADS, WCST, and C.O.W.A. tests of executive function 
(Table 3).  
 
[insert table 3 here] 
Measure of behavioral insight (DEX –Wilson et al., 1996) 
We compared Self-ratings (DEX-S) of the two patient groups to Independent-ratings 
(DEX-I) made by spouses, siblings or significant others. Marked behavioral problems 
and lack of insight into post-injury deficits is typified by higher and contrasting DEX-
I compared to DEX-S ratings across items (i.e. patients may rate themselves as having 
deficits but lack correspondence between Self- and Independent-raters for type of 
deficit(s) identified signifying poor behavioral insight). Early Injury patients rated 
themselves as most affected by ‘lack of insight and social awareness,’ ‘shallowing of 
affective responses,’ ‘distractibility,’ and ‘lack of concern for social rules.’ 
Independent-raters scored ‘impulsivity,’ ‘confabulation,’ ‘euphoria,’ ‘perseveration,’ 
‘restlessness,’ ‘shallowing of affective responses,’ and ‘impaired temporal 
sequencing’ most highly. Total Self- (M = 29.1, SD 17.8, range: 0-71) and 
Independent-ratings (M = 36.1, SD 20.2, range: 3-77) were computed for each person. 
Pearson’s correlation showed no significant relationship between DEX-S and DEX-I 
scores r (16) = .38, p = .13 two-tailed indicating diminished awareness of type of 
deficit exhibited post-injury.  
 
Late Injury patients rated ‘unconcern for social rules,’ ‘shallowing of affective 
responses,’ and ‘aggression’ most highly. Independent-ratings corresponded, but also 
included high ratings for the ‘inability to inhibit responses’ items. Again, total Self- 
(M = 36.9, SD 17.8, range: 3-65) and Independent- (M = 41.2, SD 18.5, range: 1-71) 
ratings were computed for each person. DEX-S and DEX-I scores showed a good 
level of behavioral insight into type of deficit identified as problematic by Late Injury 
patients r (16) = .57, p = .02 two-tailed. Discrepancy between DEX-S and DEX-I 
ratings was measured by calculating a DEX-Insight score for each patient group in 
line with recommendations by test authors and others (Burgess, Alderman, Emslie, 
Evans, & Wilson, 1998; Bennett, Ong & Ponsford, 2005; Hart, Seignourel & Sherer, 
2009). DEX-Insight scores are computed by subtracting Self- from Independent-
ratings. Early Injury patients had a mean DEX-Insight score of 6.9 (SD 20.9, range: -
21-48), contrasted with a mean score of 4.2 (SD 16.9, range: -19-42) for Late Injury 
patients. DEX-Insight scores were not significantly different for patient groups t 
(1,30) = .41, p = .69 two-tailed, although mean DEX-Insight score was higher for the 
Early Injury group. Correlation analysis between time since injury and DEX-Insight 
showed that duration of time since injury was not associated with degree of 
behavioral insight r (32) = .02, p = .96. 
 Implicit experimental tasks: Patient and matched control data 
Serial Reaction Time task 
Several patients were slower on the sequence compared to random blocks at test 
(Early Injury group = 5, Late Injury group = 5) producing a negative learning score 
that accounts for large standard deviations in both patient groups compared to 
controls. For the Early Injury group, mean learning score was significantly lower for 
patients (9.6, SD 106.5) than controls (96.4, SD 40.5), t (1, 30) = 3.04, p = .005 two-
tailed. Mean explicit measure scores were below the threshold of 16 and similar for 
patients (6.8, SD 4.7), and controls (8.4, SD 3.6), t (1, 30) = -1.05, p = .31 two-tailed; 
explicit knowledge of the sequence did not account for sequence learning differences 
between patient and control groups. In contrast, Late Injury group mean scores (33.1, 
SD 141.8) were not significantly different from control scores (86.7, SD 79.4), t (1, 
30) = -1.32, p = .21 two-tailed although learning scores were lower for the patient 
group. Mean explicit measure scores were also similar for patients (7.8, SD 1.9), and 
controls (8.7, SD 3.1), t (1, 30) = -.87, p = .39 two-tailed. Findings indicate that Early 
Injury patients were more impaired than Late Injury patients compared to matched 
controls on this task. It is unlikely that impaired explicit cognition mediated these 
effects because patient groups were not different from controls in this respect.  
 
Mere exposure effect priming scores were analyzed non-parametrically because 
ratings constituted ordinal data. For Early Injury patients mean prime scores (1.7, SD 
5.7) did not differ from control scores (2.8, SD 2.9), Mann-Whitney U: z = -.89, p = 
.38 two-tailed. However, the difference between target and foil preference ratings 
only reached statistical significance for controls z = -2.76, p = .006 two-tailed, and z = 
-.97, p = .33 two-tailed for patients, showing a mere exposure effect in controls that 
was absent in the patient group. Mean prime scores were different for Late Injury 
group patients (1.1, SD 3.8), and controls (3.2, SD 3.3), z = -1.97, p = .04 two-tailed. 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test confirmed a priming effect for controls, z = -2.94, p = 
.003 two-tailed, but not for patients, z = -.88, p = .31 two-tailed, again indicating no 
mere exposure effect in patients compared to controls. 
 
Classification of WAIS, WMS-R and executive function scores by case. 
 
Group means can sometimes mask the heterogeneity of deficit and sparing across 
individuals so we classified individual test performance for Early (table 4) and Late 
Injury cases (table 5) on IQ, memory and executive function subtests based upon test 
manual scoring criteria (impaired ability typically falls at or below the 5
th
 percentile). 
BADS total score is provided here rather than BADS subtest scores because total 
score was used in subsequent analyses; C.O.W.A. scores are not included because this 
variable showed no relationship with DEX-Insight for either group. Individual scores 
for implicit experimental tasks are not included here because these tasks lack 
sensitivity at the individual rather than the group level. Data show that despite 
heterogeneous performance patterns across cases in both groups there were few 
marked differences between groups. The Late Injury group had several cases showing 
impaired performance on the Verbal IQ (3 borderline/1 impaired) subtest of the WAIS 
not seen in the Early Injury group, and the Early Injury group had a greater number of 
cases impaired on the General Memory measure of the WMS-R (3 impaired/3 
borderline compared to 1 impaired/2 borderline: Early Injury group). The greatest 
distinction between the groups lay in executive function scores, with the Late Injury 
group showing more cases with impaired performance on the Hayling subtest of 
response inhibition (8 cases compared to 4 in the Early Injury group), although groups 
were not significantly different in frequency of impaired ability on this measure c
2
(1, 
N = 32) = 1.33, p = .38. Early and Late Injury groups had the same number of cases 
impaired on the BADS (n = 3) although the Early Injury group had a slightly greater 
number of borderline cases (n = 5) than the Late Injury group (n = 2). Case data were 
not notably different on other subtest measures.  
 
[Insert table 4 and 5 here] 
 
Our previous work (Barker et al., 2006) showed a relationship between executive 
function measured by the BADS (selected because it provides a global score across a 
range of subtests of executive functions) and implicit cognition measured by SRT task 
learning score. Impaired performance on both measures was associated with high 
DEX-Insight scores indicating poor behavioral insight after injury. In the present 
study, we tested whether these relationships varied as an effect of age at injury. For 
the Early Injury group, analyses confirmed that most executive function scores 
correlated negatively with DEX-Insight (high DEX-Insight score indicates poor 
behavioral insight), BADS r (16) = -.65, p .003 one-tailed, WCST r (16) = -.59, p = 
.008 one-tailed, and Hayling r (16) = -.50, p = .02 one-tailed. Neither SRT r (16) = -
.34, p = .10 one-tailed, or mere exposure priming score r (16) = -23, p = .19 one-
tailed, correlated with DEX-Insight for the Early Injury group.  
 
There was no relationship between executive function scores and behavioral insight 
for the Late Injury group, BADS r (16) = .20, p = .23 one-tailed, WCST r (16) = .03, 
p = .45 one-tailed, and Hayling r (16) = .26, p = .17 one-tailed. In contrast to the Early 
Injury group, there were marginally significant correlations between implicit tasks 
and DEX-insight scores, SRT r (16) = .39, p = .06 one-tailed, and mere exposure 
priming score r (16) = -.41, p = .058 one-tailed for Late Injury patients. Results 
suggest a different pattern of relationship between executive function, implicit 
cognition and DEX-Insight for each patient group. To test further whether age at time 
of injury moderated relationships between these variables we conducted hierarchical 
regressions with BADS and SRT scores as predictor variables and DEX-Insight as the 
criterion variable. 
 
Interaction effects: age at time of injury, executive and implicit function and 
behavioral insight. 
 
To preserve predictive power, two separate hierarchical regressions were conducted 
for age at injury, either BADS or SRT variables (see Table 6 and 7), and the 
interaction term (BADS*age at injury and SRT*age at injury, respectively) as 
predictors of DEX-Insight. DEX-Insight served as the dependent variable in both 
analyses. The interaction variables were created as the products of centred versions of 
BADS and SRT variables and the dichotomous age at injury variable consistent with 
recommendations (see Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). Independent variables were entered 
in three blocks, with the relevant cognitive variable (either BADS or SRT) entered 
first. The second block contained the categorical variable 'age at injury' (Early Injury 
= 0, Late Injury = 1), and the interaction term was entered in the third block. This 
final step computed whether the relationship between cognitive variables and DEX-
Insight was moderated by age at injury, and whether the moderation had predictive 
utility beyond that of the main effects of age at injury and BADS/SRT. Change 
statistics in the first model show that scores on BADS explained 11% of the variance 
in DEX-Insight across both groups, that the injury group variable did not add to the 
variance on its own, and that the interaction between BADS and age at injury 
explained an additional 16% (R
2
-∆ = .16) of the variance in DEX-Insight scores.  
In the final step, the unique regression coefficients (see Table 6) indicate that the 
interaction between age at injury and executive function as measured by BADS scores 
was a significant unique predictor of DEX-Insight. This suggests that age at injury 
was a moderator in the relationship between executive function and behavioral 
insight. There was a strong inverse relationship between BADS and DEX-Insight for 
the Early Injury group r (32) = -.65 p = .006 two-tailed, indicating that low BADS 
scores were associated with low levels of behavioral awareness (high DEX-Insight 
discrepancy scores). There was no relationship between BADS score and DEX-
Insight for the Late Injury group r (32) = .20, p = .45 two-tailed (Figure 1). 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 [Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The interaction between age at injury and implicit cognition (SRT scores) was only 
marginally significant. The change statistics show that beyond the individual 
contributions of age at injury and SRT scores, the interaction of the two explained a 
further 12.7% of variance in DEX-Insight scores (R
2
-∆ = .127, see Table 7). This is a 
moderate effect with marginal significance p = .052 two-tailed. Simple effect analysis 
showed that the relationship between SRT and DEX-Insight followed a different 
direction for each patient group (i.e., positive for the Late Injury group, inverse for the 
Early Injury group) although neither analyses were significant (Late Injury r (32) = 
.39, p = .14 two-tailed) and r (32) = -.34, p = .20 two-tailed for the Early Injury group. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here]  
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Overall, findings from interaction analyses indicate that age at time of injury strongly 
moderates the contribution of executive function to behavioral insight, but that 
moderating effects of age at injury on the contribution of implicit cognition to insight 
is less clear.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Closed head injury patients were assigned to Early and Late Injury groups on the basis 
of age at time of injury. Early Injury patients sustained insult in adolescence and early 
adulthood, a period of rapid morphological change to anterior regions thought to 
correspond with maturation of social and ‘higher-order’ cognitive abilities 
(Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; Romine & Reynolds, 2005). Late Injury patients 
sustained injury from late twenties through to middle age. Patients were matched to 
controls for age, IQ, years of education and demography and were not different on 
measures of IQ, attention and memory at the group level. There was no significant 
decline from pre-morbid to present IQ status, although most patients showed a small 
decrease in IQ points from pre-morbid levels. Patients were more than two years post-
injury at time of test in line with recommendations that this period represents the 
acute phase of recovery (Lezak, 2004), and differed significantly in this respect. Early 
Injury patients had a slightly longer mean duration of time since injury than the Late 
Injury group, although we found no relationship between time since injury and 
behavioral insight. Imaging data, GCS scores and medical records revealed similar 
loci and extent of brain injury in the two groups, although the Late Injury group 
included a greater number of cases with bilateral pathology, and had greater mean 
duration of PTA compared to Early Injury patients. Both groups were impaired on the 
mere exposure effect task but the Early Injury group alone showed impaired 
performance on the SRT task compared to controls. Both groups had higher mean 
DEX-I than DEX-S ratings typically interpreted as evidence of diminished behavioral 
insight (Flashman & McAllister, 2002; Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Burgess et al., 1998; 
Hart, Seignourel & Sherer, 2009). There was evidence of some residual insight into 
post-injury problems for Late Injury patients shown by corresponding DEX-S and 
DEX-I ratings not seen for Early Injury group ratings. Indeed Early Injury patients 
identified wholly different deficits as problematic compared to DEX-I ratings. Results 
are unlikely to reflect unreliable DEX-I ratings because evidence shows that 
significant others make reliable deficit ratings on the DEX except in acute 
circumstances immediately post-injury when the patient is typically hospitalized 
(Bennett, Ong & Ponsford, 2005; Chan & Bode, 2008). Groups were not different on 
the DEX-Insight discrepancy measure signifying impaired insight into severity of 
deficits in both groups.  
 
Group means were similar across most neuropsychological tests though Late Injury 
patients showed poorer ability on Hayling and Brixton subtests of response inhibition 
and rule detection falling within low average ranges. Poorer performance on these 
tasks by Late Injury patients may be related to impaired inhibitory control reported by 
Independent-raters not identified by Self-ratings on the DEX.  
 
At the individual case level heterogeneous patterns of functional ability were evident 
within groups as would be expected after TBI. However, despite this heterogeneity of 
functional outcome shared patterns of deficit and sparing also emerged across groups. 
A relatively equal number of cases in both groups showed Processing Speed (WAIS-
III) and Visual Memory (WMS-R) deficits on IQ and memory subtests. Both groups 
showed relatively similar patterns of executive function impairment but were 
distinguished by greater number of cases impaired on the Hayling subtest for the Late 
Injury group. There were more cases with impaired General Memory in the Early 
Injury group and more evidence of Verbal IQ deficits in the Late Injury group. It is 
unlikely that higher number of cases with General Memory problems mediated ability 
on executive and implicit tasks in Early Injury patients because executive tasks were 
administered with written instructions visible throughout testing, implicit task 
performance is not dependent on explicit memory processes (Jiménéz & Méndez, 
2001), and groups showed similar levels of impairment on the mere exposure implicit 
task compared to controls. Both groups showed a similar number of cases with 
Processing Speed and Visual Memory deficits but only Early Injury patients were 
impaired on the SRT compared to controls making it unlikely that these deficits 
impeded implicit learning. 
 
To summarize, general cognitive abilities were similar across the Early and Late 
Injury groups, including executive abilities with the exception of performance on the 
Hayling and Brixton subtests. The Late Injury group performed more poorly on these 
two subtests. In contrast, the Early Injury group were more impaired on the measures 
of implicit cognition and showed poorer behavioral insight. Considered together these 
data provide little evidence to support the Kennard principle (1940) that early insult to 
frontal regions results in greater functional sparing than later injuries particularly in 
relation to executive function ability. Likewise these data offer little support to the 
notion that early injuries result in graver functional deficits than later injuries.  
 
Further analyses revealed differences in the pattern of relationships between executive 
measures, implicit tasks and DEX-Insight across groups. BADS, WCST, and Hayling 
executive scores correlated negatively with DEX-Insight scores for Early Injury 
patients (low EF score and high DEX-Insight score equaling poor insight and vice 
versa). There was no significant correlation between implicit task scores and DEX-
Insight despite impaired ability on both implicit tasks in Early Injury patients.  
 
The inverse pattern was seen for the Late Injury group, no significant relationship 
between executive function scores (BADS total score, Hayling, and WCST) and 
DEX-Insight (even though patients were more impaired on the Hayling and Brixton 
than Early Injury patients), and marginally significant relationships between SRT and 
mere exposure scores and DEX-Insight. These results suggest a definitive role of 
executive function to behavioral insight after early injuries. Data are less clear-cut 
about the contribution of implicit cognition to behavioral insight. The Late Injury 
group showed some residual insight into deficits based on DEX-I and DEX-S data, 
although DEX-Insight scores did not differ for patient groups. Late Injury patients 
were not impaired on the SRT task compared to matched controls unlike the early 
injury group, and analyses showed marginally significant correlations with implicit 
task scores and DEX-Insight in the Late Injury group alone. These group differences 
Comment [pa1]: Please check my 
summary is correct –it is late! 
seem best explained as an effect of age at time of injury as group means were not 
significantly different on neuropsychological tests, DEX-Insight, BADS or 
neurological variables despite within-group variability.  
 
Our earlier work found a significant relationship between BADS and SRT scores and 
impairments on both contributed to behavioral insight (Barker et al., 2006). Results of 
hierarchical regression analyses showed that overall executive ability measured by the 
BADS made a significant contribution to behavioral insight in Early compared to Late 
Injury patients. The magnitude of the interaction term effect was large and was the 
strongest unique predictor of DEX-Insight scores. In contrast, there was no significant 
relationship between BADS and DEX-Insight scores for the Late Injury group. These 
data support the assumption that age at time of injury and executive ability are 
important predictors of behavioral insight after pathology to anterior structures (Hart, 
Whyte, Kim & Vaccaro, 2005; Schmitz et al., 2006). Findings might also shed some 
light on conflicting evidence that executive functions contribute to behavioral insight 
(Bogod, Mateer, & Macdonald, 2003), or conversely show no relationship with 
behavioral insight (O’Keeffe et al., 2007) in studies where age at time of injury is not 
accounted for.  
 
The interaction effect for regression analysis with SRT and DEX-Insight was 
relatively weak and only marginally significant. Regression lines fell in opposite 
directions for the two patient groups, although neither reached significance. However, 
the trend towards an inverse SRT/DEX relationship in the Early Injury group is in line 
with the executive function/DEX relationship also seen in the Early Injury group and 
consistent with predictions based on earlier work (Barker et al., 2006; Hart et al., 
2005; Schmitz et al., 2006).  
 
We can only speculate on the reasons for the difference in relationships between 
cognitive functions and insight as an effect of age-at-injury. Longitudinal case study 
findings show that early frontal injuries result in executive deficits associated with 
severe behavioral problems compared to later injuries (Williams & Mateer, 1992; 
Eslinger & Biddle, 2000; Anderson et al., 2005), though theoretically it is unclear 
why this should be the case: Few interpretations of these data go beyond the 
‘developmental sensitivity’ argument. Behavioral insight is thought to depend upon 
the integration of several functions, including preattentive, metacognitive, implicit, 
executive and regulatory functions (Barker et al., 2006; Morton & Barker, 2010; 
Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004; Schacter, 1990), and somatic physiological markers 
(Damasio, 1996), though constitutive cognitive components of insight need more fine-
grained specification. In normal development these contributory processes may 
cohere into a functional system integrated by executive function control mechanisms 
(Bogod, Williams, & Mateer 2003). Pathology sustained during developmentally 
sensitive periods may render the system vulnerable resulting in poorer functional 
integration. The net effect may be an executive ‘hegemony’ so that when executive 
functions are diminished during developmentally sensitive periods there are fewer and 
less well-integrated compensatory mechanisms in place. Injury to anterior regions in 
early adolescence through to early adulthood is more likely to diminish integrative 
and coordinating rather than ‘elemental’ cognitive functions in an immature and 
consequently inherently vulnerable functional system (Paus, 2005; Johnston, 2009; 
Hebb, 1949). Indeed, research shows that early insult also disrupts integrative aspects 
of language functional systems whilst selective ability may remain intact (Demir, 
Levine & Goldin-Meadow, 2009). Executive functions are also disrupted in later 
injuries but evidence of dissociation between executive ability and behavior suggest 
the effects on behavior may be less severe compared to early injury (Barker, Andrade 
& Romanowski, 2004; Andrés, & Van der Linden, 2002). This hypothesis might go 
some way to explain our findings of a contribution of executive function to behavioral 
insight after early compared to late injury, an effect moderated by age at time of 
injury. More data are needed on the normal developmental trajectory of a range of 
functions and corresponding maturational change to address this possibility. The 
pattern of data for Late Injury patients, no significant contribution of executive 
function or implicit cognition to behavioral insight, indicate a possible contributory 
role of other processes to insight not measured here. This possibility does not 
correspond well with Early Injury group data, but supports the notion of a multi-
componential functional system underpinning insight that may have been more robust 
in the Late Injury group due to normal maturation of anterior regions prior to injury. 
Hence evidence of residual awareness shown in the Late but not the Early Injury 
group.  
 
Individual case data showed that head injury sustained as early as age 12 results in 
enduring deficits to executive and other functions. All patients were a minimum of 18 
at test so most Early Injury patients were well on in the recovery process. This finding 
partially supports the latent-deficit hypothesis though whether early insult results in 
graver deficits than later injuries is difficult to quantify from present data. However, 
functional effects of early head injury were comparable with later injuries even 
though neurological variables showed greater incidence of bilateral pathology, greater 
duration of PTA and less time since injury for Late Injury patients (see also Fay et al., 
2009). This neurological profile predicts more severe head injury and greater 
functional deficits in Late compared to Early Injury patients that may have been 
masked by similar functional outcome in Early Injury patients. It is likely that both 
groups showed some functional recovery since the acute stage but in the absence of 
baseline data immediately post-injury it is not possible to determine whether this 
differed significantly for groups. Overall, the moderating effect of age at time of 
injury on executive, implicit and DEX-insight variables seems less important when 
injury is sustained from late twenties onwards shown by the non-significant effects for 
Late Injury patients in regression data.  
 
There are several limitations of the study that future work might address. Head injured 
groups are intrinsically heterogeneous in functional outcome and pathology making it 
difficult to control for all confounds. In the present study age at time of injury varied 
within groups, as we were unable to recruit sufficient patients who sustained injury at 
the same time. This variability in age at injury may have had differential effects on 
maturational processes although functionally the spread of deficits was similar at the 
case level and early injury patients were more similar in age at time of test than at 
time of injury. Additionally our sample comprised only three females reflecting 
regional variability in head injury demographics. A greater number of female patients 
included in the study might have produced a different pattern of results. 
 
To conclude, present data do not demonstrate greater impairment or greater functional 
plasticity after early compared to later injuries. Instead we found a significant 
relationship between executive function and insight and more impaired implicit 
cognition compared to controls after early compared to later injuries. Age at injury 
moderated the relationship between cognitive processes and behavioral insight. 
Further research aimed at elucidating the interplay between these processes following 
injury should take age at injury into account. Likewise, research into the normal 
development of these processes should consider the development of relationships 
between processes as well as the individual processes themselves. 
 
Our findings show that early injuries result in long-standing deficits to functions 
associated with frontal regions partially supporting the latent deficit hypothesis. 
Although our data speak only indirectly to maturational imaging work, future studies 
might track morphological brain changes and functional ability longitudinally into 
middle adulthood to broaden our knowledge of the relationship between function, 
brain morphology and behavioral consequences of early brain injury. 
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Table 1. IQ, neurological and demographic data of patients and controls. 
 
Full-Scale IQ 
score 
Patients 
Full-Scale IQ 
score 
controls 
Pre-morbid IQ 
Patients 
Age at Injury 
(Yrs: 
months) 
Age at test GCS 
score 
PTA 
(days) 
1. 78 84 76 12.10 20 5 18 
2. 102 103 108 14.11 21 11 4 
3. 88 94 90 14.9 24 4 8 
4. 94 102 101 15.9 21 5 11 
5. 82 96 87 17.8 20 4 30 
6. 104 94 106 17.8 25 8 7 
7. 102 95 90 17.6 26 13 2 
8. 104 109 75 18.10 26 3 8 
9. 105 97 107 18.7 24 6 28 
10. 109 100 102 20.3 23 5 30 
11. 104 104 100 20.2 26 3 120 
12. 87 81 81 20.8 25 5 15 
13. 91 95 96 21.2 31 3 14 
14. 86 102 89 21.1 30 5 7 
15. 110 110 110 22.11 25 6 14 
16. 97 95 87 25.4 28 5 56 
M = 96.4  
(SD 10.0) 
M = 97.6  
(SD 7.8) 
M = 94.1  
(SD 11.3) 
M = 18.6  
(SD 3.3) 
M = 24.7 
(SD 3.3) 
M = 5.4 
(SD 3.1) 
M = 22.1 
(SD 29.7) 
17. 87 90 89 28.11 33 4 3 
18. 109 105 111 30.2 34 3 28 
19. 75 80 78 30.5 33 3 300 
20. 80 90 82 31.2 34 4 32 
21. 99 104 94 33.4 37 13 3 
22. 127 129 127 36.2 40 4 15 
23. 85 80 86 36.1 38 3 69 
24. 105 108 106 38.8 42 3 90 
25. 80 84 82 39.7 43 5 40 
26. 97 95 95 44.4 47 10 8 
27. 87 90 87 46.5 49 6 15 
28. 85 92 87 47.5 56 4 11 
29. 80 85 82 48.2 52 3 18 
30. 104 109 103 49.5 55 3 150 
31. 100 102 102 54.3 59 3 200 
32. 99 112 98 55.1 59 5 18 
M = 93.7  
(SD 13.8) 
M = 97.2  
(SD 13.5) 
M = 94. 3  
(SD 13.1) 
M = 40.6  
(SD 8.9) 
M = 44.4 
(SD 9.5) 
M = 4.7 
(SD 2.8) 
M = 62.5 
(SD 84.7) 
 
 
 
Table 2. Locus of neuropathology for Early and Late Injury groups categorized by 
Brodmann’s Areas (BA)   
 
Patient Right 
VMPFC 
Right 
DLPFC 
Left  
VMPFC 
Left  
DLPFC 
Additional frontal and other 
brain regions 
Early Injury Group 
Case 1 BA (10), (11), 
(13), (14), (47) 
BA (44), 
(45),(46), (8), 
(9) 
BA (10), 
(11), (13) 
 Minimal damage to temporal pole  
BA (38), (21)  
Case 3 Acollosal  Acollosal   
Case 4 BA (47) 
 
BA (8) BA (47)  Bilateral temporal gyrus 
Case 6  BA (44), (45)  (44) Moderate pathology to right temporal 
pole minimal to left 
Case 7  BA (44), (45)    
Case 8 BA  not 
specified (CT 
only) 
 BA  not 
specified 
(CT only) 
  
Case 9 BA (10), (11), 
(13), (14), (47) 
BA (44), 
(45),(46), (8), 
(9) 
BA (10), 
(11), (13), 
(14), (47) 
BA (44), 
(45), (46), 
(8), (9) 
 
Case 10   (10), (11)  
 
Small haemorrhagic cavity in Corpus 
Callosum across both sides anteriorly 
Case 11    BA (8), (9), 
(46) 
 
Case 12   BA (10), 
(11), (13) 
  
Case 13   BA (11), 
(13) 
 Left temporal lobe 
Case 14     Global atrophy and foci of high signal 
to frontal regions 
Case 15     Focal lesion to Centrum 
Semiovale 
Case 16 BA (10), (11)     
Late Injury Group  
Case 1     Middle temporal gyrus 
Inferior temporal gyrus bilaterally 
Case 2     Left frontal lobe lacuna infarcts. 
Case 3 BA (10), (11), 
(13), (14), (47) 
BA (44), 
(45),(46), 
(8), (9) 
BA (10), (11), 
(13) 
 Minimal damage to temporal pole  
BA (38), (21)  
Case 4 BA (10), (11)  BA (10), (11), 
(13) 
  
Case 6 BA (10), (11), 
(12), (13), (14). 
(47) 
BA (46), 
(45) 
BA (10), (11), 
(12), (13), (14). 
(47) 
BA (45) Left and right temporal pole 
Case 7 BA (10),(11), 
(13), (14), (47) 
BA (9) BA (10),(11), 
(13), (14), (47) 
BA (44), 
(45). (46), 
(9),(8) 
 
Case 8 Extensive 
pathology 
(BA not 
specified) 
Extensive 
pathology 
(BA  not 
specified) 
   
Case 9 BA (10), (11), 
(13), (14), (47) 
BA (44), 
(45),(46), 
(8), (9) 
BA (10), (11), 
(13), (14), (47) 
BA (44), 
(45), (46), 
(8), (9) 
 
Case 10   BA (10), (11), 
(13) 
  
Case 11 BA (13), (14), 
(47) 
 BA (12), (13)   
Case 12     Global atrophy excessive for age and 
foci of high signal to white matter in 
frontal regions 
Case 13 BA (10), (11), 
(12) 
 BA (14)   
Case 15   BA (47), (11), 
(12), (13) 
 Left temporal pole 
 
Case 16 BA (10), (11), 
(12) 
 BA (10), (11)  Patchy small vessel ischaemic change 
in right frontal lobe 
 Table 3. Mean (SD) and range scores on neuropsychological measures for Early and 
Late Injury groups. 
 
Neuropsychological Test Early injury group 
Mean (SD), range 
Late Injury Group 
Mean (SD), range 
WAIS: Subtest scores 
Verbal IQ 
97.6 (11.8) 
Range: 84 -127 
91.8 (15.2) 
Range: 66-119 
Performance IQ 93.2 (13.6) 
Range: 68 - 119 
95.0 (15.5) 
Range: 72-130 
Verbal Comprehension Index 97.2 (12.7) 
Range: 76-124 
93.2 (16.1) 
Range: 67-116 
Perceptual Organisation Index 101.1 (16.9) 
Range: 72-125 
103.8 (18.3) 
Range: 78-148 
Working Memory Index 97.6 (16.3) 
Range: 71-130 
93.6 (14.7) 
Range: 69-126 
Processing speed 81.1 (12.5) 
Range: 60-103 
85.7 (14.1) 
Range: 69-120 
WMS-R Subtest scores 
Verbal Memory 
89.7 (12.8) 
Range: 63-111 
83.3 (13.6) 
Range: 65-107 
Visual Memory 85.2 (23.4) 
Range: 50-138 
84.8 (16.7) 
Range: 50-110 
General Memory 85.8 (17.1) 
Range 55-123 
80.3 (15.8) 
Range: 55-108 
Attention/concentration 95.1 (15.2) 
Range: 67-120 
88.4 (17.7) 
Range: 62-125 
Executive Function scores 
Hayling 
 
5.4 (1.5) 
Range: 2-8 
 
3.5 (1.9) 
Range: 1-7 
Brixton 5.8 (2.1) 
Range: 1-10 
4.1 (2.3) 
Range: 1-8 
BADS total score 85.4 (20.8) 
Range: 43-118 
84.1 (15.3) 
Range: 54-102 
WCST 84.7 (36.4) 
Range: 0-125 
79.1 (28.7) 
Range: 0-124 
C.O.W.A (FAS) 
Total score 
31.7 (8.8) 
Range: 19-45 
33.0 (16.8) 
Range: 14-69 
 
Table 4.  Early injury group individual performance categorizations on WAIS III, WMS-R, and executive function tests. 
 
 
 
WAIS-III subtest WMS-R subtest  Executive function tasks Age at 
Injury 
Case Verbal IQ Performance 
IQ 
Verbal 
Comp. Index 
Perceptual 
Org. Index 
Working 
Memory 
Index 
Processing 
Speed 
Verbal 
Memory 
Visual 
Memory 
General 
Memory 
Attention Hayling Brixton BADS 
Overall  
WCST Yrs:mths 
1. Low Ave.a Low Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Low Ave. Border.b Ave. Ave. Ave. Impaired Impaired Impaired Impaired Border. 12.10 
2. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Sup.c Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Sup. Border. Sup. Border. Sup. 14.11 
3. Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Impaired Ave. Impaired Low Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Ave. Border. V. Impaired 14.9 
4. Ave. High Ave. Ave. Sup. Ave. Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Border. Ave. Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Ave. 15.9 
5. Sup. Border. Sup. Ave. Sup. Border. Ave. Border. Ave. High Ave. Impaired High Ave. V. Impaired Impaired 17.8 
6. Low Ave. Border. Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Impaired Ave. Impaired Low Ave. Low Ave. High Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Low Ave. 17.8 
7. Ave. High Ave. Ave. High Ave. Ave. Ave. Border. Ave. Border. Border. High Ave. High Ave. High Ave. Ave. 17.6 
8. Low Ave. Ave. Ave. Border. Low Ave. Impaired Ave. V. Impaired Impaired Low Ave. Ave. Ave. V. Impaired Ave. 18.10 
9. Ave. Border. Low Ave. Ave. Low Ave. Impaired Low Ave. Impaired Border. Ave. Ave. Ave. Border. Impaired 18.7 
10. Ave. Border. Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Border. Impaired Impaired V. Impaired Low Ave. High Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Ave. 20.3 
11. Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Ave. Low Ave. Border. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Impaired Ave. Low Ave. Ave. 20.2 
12. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. High Ave. Ave. High Ave. V. Sup. V. Sup. Sup. Ave. Ave. Border. High Ave. 20.8 
13. Low Ave. Low Ave. Border. Ave. Ave. Border. V. 
Impaired 
Low Ave. Impaired Ave. Low Ave. V. Impaired Border. Low Ave. 21.2 
14. Ave. High Ave. Ave. Sup. Impaired Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Border. Ave. Ave. 21.1 
15. High Ave. Ave. Sup. High Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. High Ave. High Ave. High Ave. 22.11 
16. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Border. Low Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. 25.4 
aAverage, bBorderline, C Superior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Early injury group individual performance categorizations on WAIS III, WMS-R, and executive function tests. 
 
 
 
WAIS-III subtests WMS-R subtests Executive function tasks Age at 
Injury 
Case Verbal IQ Performance 
IQ 
Verbal 
Comp. 
Index 
Perceptual 
Org. Index 
Working 
Memory 
Index 
Processing
Speed 
Verbal 
Memory 
Visual 
Memory 
General 
Memory 
Attention Hayling Brixton BADS 
Overall  
WCST Yrs:Mths 
1. Ave.a Ave. Ave. High Ave. Low Ave. Border.b Low Ave. Impaired Border. Border. Impaired High Ave. Ave. Sup.c 28.11 
2. High Ave. Ave. High Ave. High Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Impaired 30.2 
3. Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Ave. Border. Low Ave. Border. Border. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Impaired Impaired 30.5 
4. Border. Border. Border. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Border. Low Ave. Impaired Impaired Ave. Low Ave. Border. 31.2 
5. Ave. High Ave. Ave. Sup. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. High Ave. Ave. Ave. Low Ave. 33.4 
6. High Ave. Sup. High Ave. V. Sup. Sup. Sup. Ave. Ave. Ave. Sup. Ave. High Ave. Ave. Low Ave. 36.2 
7. Impaired Ave. Impaired High Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Border. Low Ave. V. Impaired Low Ave. Border. Ave. Border. Ave. 36.1 
8. Low Ave. Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Impaired Border. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Border. Impaired High Ave. Ave. V. Impaired 38.8 
9. Low Ave. Border. Ave. Low Ave. Border. Low Ave. Ave. Border. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Impaired Border. Ave. 39.7 
10. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. 44.4 
11. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. High Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Low Ave. High Ave. Border. Ave. Ave. Low Ave. 46.5 
12. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Ave. Border. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Average 47.5 
13. Ave. Ave. Ave. High Ave. Ave. Ave. Low Ave. High Ave. Ave. Ave. High Ave. Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. 48.2 
14. Ave. Border. Ave. Low Ave. Ave. Impaired Low Ave. V. Impaired Low Ave. Ave. Impaired Impaired Impaired Border. 49.5 
15. Border. Low Ave. Border. Ave. Low Ave. Border. Impaired Low Ave. Low Ave. Low Ave. Impaired Impaired V. Impaired Low Ave. 54.3 
16. Border. Low Ave. Border. Low Ave. Low Ave. Impaired Ave. Border. Ave. Low Ave. Border. Impaired Low Ave. Low Ave. 55.1 
aAverage, bBorderline, C Superior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Hierarchical regression analysis with BADS score, age at injury and 
BADS/age at injury interaction term as predictor variables and DEX-Insight as the 
dependent variable with all head-injured participants (N = 32).  
 
Independent variables entered R
2
-∆ F-∆ Df  
Step 1: Continuous predictor variable .11 3.68† 1,30 — 
BADS score —  —  —  -.63** 
Step 2: Categorical moderator variable .01 .16 1,29 — 
Age at injury — —  —  -.07 
Step 3: Interaction term .16 6.59* 1,28 — 
Interaction effect between BADS and age at 
injury 
—  —  —  .43* 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients () are shown for the model at step 3. 
† p = .07, * p = .02, ** p < .01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Hierarchical regression analysis with SRT score, age at injury and SRT/age 
at injury interaction term as predictor variables, and DEX-Insight as the dependent 
variable with all head-injured participants (N = 32). 
Independent variables entered R
2
-∆ F-∆ Df  
Step 1: Continuous predictor variable .00 .03 1,30 — 
SRT score —  —  —  -.44 
Step 2: Categorical moderator variable .01 .16 1,29 — 
Age at injury — —  —  -.07 
Step 3: Interaction term .13 4.11
†
 1,28 — 
Interaction effect between SRT and age at injury —  —  —  .60† 
Note. Standardized regression coefficients () are shown for the model at step 3. 
†
 p =.052 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend for Figure 1. Interaction between BADS and age at injury on behavioral 
insight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend for Figure 2. Interaction between SRT score and age at injury on behavioral 
insight 
 
 
